Culture, beliefs and economic performance by Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch
  
Culture, Beliefs and Economic 
Performance 
Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch 
Motu Working Paper 14-06 







Author contact details 
Rafael Di Tella 
Harvard Business School  
 
Robert MacCulloch 
University of Auckland and Motu Affiliate 
r.macculloch@auckland.ac.nz 
Acknowledgements 
We especially wish to thank Javier Donna for research assistance. For helpful discussions and 
suggestions, we thank Sebastian Galiani and Ernesto Schargrodsky. The Japan Europe 
Cooperation Fund provided us with financial support. This paper is released as part of Motu’s 
Marsden-funded programme Testing the Validity and Robustness of National Wellbeing and 
Sustainability Measures. 
Motu Economic and Public Policy Research 
PO Box 24390 
Wellington 
New Zealand 
Email  info@motu.org.nz 
Telephone +64 4 9394250 
Website www.motu.org.nz 
© 2014 Motu Economic and Public Policy Research Trust and the authors. Short 
extracts, not exceeding two paragraphs, may be quoted provided clear attribution is 
given.  Motu Working Papers are research materials circulated by their authors for 
purposes of information and discussion. They have not necessarily undergone formal 





Beliefs are one component of culture. Data from the World Values Survey is available on a 
subset of beliefs concerning (broadly) meritocracy and poverty that appear relevant for 
economics. We document how they vary as well as their distribution across countries. We then 
correlate these measures of beliefs with economic growth and compare them with institutional 
and geographical determinants of income. A strong negative relationship is found between leftist 
economic beliefs and growth but little evidence is found of a relationship with respect to non-
economic beliefs. Finally, we briefly discuss some causal effects on beliefs. The evidence suggests 
that higher country risk and more dependence on natural resources shifts nations to a more 
leftist set of economic beliefs. Overall the evidence supports the view that cultural specificities 
may explain why certain institutions cannot be transplanted between nations with different 
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1. Introduction 
The role of culture on economic performance has been downplayed by economists, who 
have traditionally chosen to emphasize the accumulation of factors of production and technical 
progress as key determinants of economic performance. But culture as a determinant of economic 
performance was one of the first ideas developed to explain why some societies grow rich. Indeed, 
a distinguished tradition in social science, particularly important in sociology since the work of 
Max Weber, considered culture as a key determinant of individual effort and the overall quality of 
the institutions that support market friendly exchange (see, for example, Weber (1946)). While 
later work has emphasized other channels through which culture may affect economic 
organization, economists have done relatively little work on the area. One possible reason for this 
is the lack of empirical measures of culture accepted in the profession. Meanwhile, perhaps 
unconstrained by prejudice, other social scientists have continued to study these issues often 
relying on survey measures across individuals of different cultures. In recent years, however, the 
use of survey data has become more accepted in economics to study aspects related to institutional 
quality and culture, starting with work on social capital, beliefs and corruption by Knack and 
Keefer (1995, 1999), Luttmer (2001),  Mauro (1995), Alesina et al (2001) inter alia.  
Differences in beliefs and world outlook have been tied to cultural differences in some of 
the most satisfying theories designed to explain differences in economic organization across 
otherwise similar countries. For example, many observers have wondered why America has an 
economic system based on low taxes and private initiative while Europe has a system with a large 
government sector and high taxes. The best explanation we have is that there are differences in the 
beliefs Americans and Europeans have.1 This happens to be true empirically. For example, Alesina 
et al (2001) report that 60% of Americans – yet only 26% of Europeans- believe the poor are lazy.2 
Furthermore, they show that countries where few people hold this belief (as well as other beliefs 
that are compatible with the proper workings of a free market) also have more government 
intervention. Beliefs have also been tied to institutions in the work of Greif (1994) and North 
(2005). For example the latter attributes a central role to the beliefs system in shaping institutional 
designs, stating:  
                                                 
1 See, for example, Piketty (1995), Benabou and Tirole (2002), Alesina and Angeletos (2003), inter alia. 
2 Hochschild (1981) provides an illuminating discussion. See also work by Inglehart (1990), Ladd and Bowman (1998) 
and Fong (2004). 
  2 
There is an intimate relationship between belief systems and the 
institutional framework. Belief systems embody the internal representation 
of the human landscape. Institutions are the structure that humans impose 
on that landscape in order to produce the desired outcomes. Belief 
systems therefore are the internal representation and institutions the 
external manifestation of that representation. … The key to building a foundation to 
understand the process of economic change is beliefs both those held by individuals 
and shared beliefs that form beliefs systems. North (2005), pp. 77 and 119. 
In this paper we develop and explore an empirical measure of culture based on the 
available survey data. We focus on cultural beliefs that appear most relevant for economic 
performance. First, we obtain an empirically tractable definition of culture, one that is 
internationally comparable. We also attempt to explain and assess the effect of our cultural 
variables on economic performance across countries. Lastly, the approach is amenable to a 
discussion about causal effects. Although a full treatment of this difficult issue is beyond the scope 
of this project, ways to identify the exogenous factors in the determination of culture are 
discussed.  
Given the highly reductionist approach that we follow, namely one that exclusively focuses 
on beliefs as the relevant expression of culture, we should at least note the extensive previous 
work on the subject in Anthropolgy and Sociology. We discuss some of it in the next subsection 
to provide background to our approach. In brief, the more modern definitions of culture follow 
the work of Geertz (1973) and Keesing (1974). There does not seem to be an abundance of 
sources concerning how to turn these general ideas of what culture is into a dimension that is 
measurable and comparable across countries. Most work in the area has typically observed that a 
variety of cultural elements (from myths, to language to cultural objects) can be seen as 
“representing” society’s culture in one form or another. See, for example, Evans-Pritchard (1950) 
and Malinowski (1954). A second characteristic of previous work is that it has mainly focused on 
specific cultures. Indeed, the typical approach in anthropology is to gather basic data through field 
research in one or at most two societies. This means that cross-cultural generalizations are more 
the exception than the norm. Beyond this, there seems to be little work to guide us on an 
empirically fruitful definition of culture, although we note that our approach is consistent with the 
more ambitious ideas of using cross-cultural research to uncover common underlying structures 
(see Lévi-Strauss (1963, 1964)).3 
                                                 
3 Leach (1970) has a highly readable discussion of structuralist ideas in Lévi-Strauss. 
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The main data source that we use for the construction of internationally comparable 
measures of culture comes from the “World Values Survey and European Values Survey”. The 
Combined World Values Survey is produced by the Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI, 
USA, and it is specifically designed for cross-national comparison of values and norms. Both 
national random and quota sampling were used with surveys through face-to-face interviews, with 
a sampling universe consisting of all adult citizens, so a reasonably representative study can be 
undertaken. We construct country indicators for different values that are internationally 
comparable. These indicators are built from the part of the data set that appears relevant for 
economic performance. Picking these variables is partly inductive and relies both on factor analysis 
and also the dimensions that are justified theoretically in the research explaining how different 
economic systems are built on beliefs (for a thorough discussion see Hochschild (1981) and for 
theoretical models built by economists see Piketty (1995), Benabou (2000), Benabou and Tirole 
(2003) and Alesina and Angeletos (2003), inter alia). Another source of data relates to the relative 
importance of different religions in different countries. See for example Iannaccone (1998) and 
Guiso et al (2003). We use all available data on the development of civil society in conjunction 
with these cultural variables. The paper also provides some attempt at assessing the effect of our 
cultural variables on economic performance. The discussion in Denzau and North (1993) provides 
a starting point. 
Finally, it is hard to think of sources for the discussion on causal impacts on culture. We 
draw on the theoretical literature in anthropology to identify if there is an obvious approach. The 
work of Leach (1976) and Swidler (1986) provides us with a guide. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background to the 
methods that we use and our data set. Section 3 analyses the core beliefs and values that may be 
important for the economy. The different distribution of beliefs across five of the main regions of 
the world (United States, Europe, Africa, Asia and South America) is described. Using factor 
analysis we also study the degree to which these attitudes share a common basis and whether there 
is a coherent way of classifying them. Section 4 uses these beliefs and values to understand their 
importance for determining the level of income and growth rate of economies. It also presents 
results that identify effects of beliefs even after controlling for three other sets of variables that 
proxy for the chief competing theories about what determines economic performance: trade 
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integration, geography and institutions. We also explore whether the dispersion of beliefs is an 
important factor. Section 5 addresses the question of where beliefs originate from. They may not 
be ‘assigned’ randomly across the world but instead certain characteristics of regions, such as their 
risk characteristics and abundance of natural resources, may impact their inhabitants’ cultural 
views. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background, Methods and Data 
2.1. Some Previous Work on Culture 
The term culture typically describes elements that are shared by the individuals that 
constitute a particular social group: customs, symbols, systems of meaning, as well as material 
objects which delimit the social group and point to what is particular to it. The study of culture is 
central in social analysis, in particular because cultural elements define the logic through which 
events and actions shape society and lead to social change. One of the fundamental questions 
explored through the concept of culture is the explanation of differences, of how social groups 
respond in particular ways to external or internal factors (environmental, historical, economic, 
political, technological, individual creativity, etc) that affect it. This does not mean that culture 
constitutes a static system, a rigid grid through which events are incorporated and shape the lives 
of individuals since these events in turn also shape culture. Culture evolves and changes. In the 
broadest terms, culture describes the life of a social group as a coherent whole and distinguishes 
one group from another. 
Culture is a very complex phenomenon. Accordingly, very broad definitions are unhelpful 
(such as Kluckhohn’s proposed holistic view of culture as “the total way of life of a people”). 
More recently, Keesing (1974) describes two general approaches, which we now discuss. One sees 
culture as the result of human adaptation to its environment (the materialist approach), the other 
as a system of ideas. 
Culture as an adaptive system puts forward the view that “cultures are systems (of socially 
transmitted behavior patterns) that serve to relate human communities to their ecological settings” 
(Keesing, 1974:75). It comprises the technologies, economic organization, settlement patterns, 
social groupings, political organization, religious beliefs and practices that are the result of 
processes of adaptation governed by the same rules of natural selection that govern biological 
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adaptation (see for example Meggers, Amazonia: Man and Nature in a Counterfeit Paradise, 1971). It is 
based on the proposition of the biological uniformity of human nature and explains difference on 
the basis of adaptation to different material (external) conditions, mainly environmental, 
technological and economic (organization of production). In this scheme, material conditions and 
the organization of production are seen as primary (following a Marxist approach), and ideational 
systems are secondary or derivative. This doesn’t mean that attention should be paid only to 
material conditions, but that all aspects of a cultural complex will “reveal functional relationships 
with other categories of behavior that are adaptive” (Meggers, 1971:43). The more extreme 
position is represented by the cultural materialism of Marvin Harris (The Rise of Cultural Theory, 
1968). Harris proposes that “Similar technologies applied to similar environments tend to produce 
similar arrangements of labor in production and distribution, and … these in turn call forth similar 
kinds of social groupings, which justify and coordinate their activities by means of similar systems 
of values and beliefs” (Harris, 1968:4). The main problem with the materialist approach is that 
societies living in similar environments have developed very different cultural systems. This does 
not mean, however, that the materialist approach is to be discarded all together, since the natural 
and material environment definitely influences culture, although it may do so in a dialectic 
relationship with a particular system of ideas that may not result entirely from these material 
conditions. 
The view of culture as an ideational system gives primacy to ideas, values and beliefs in 
shaping the life of social groups as opposed to material conditions. This is the view that prevails 
today in sociology and anthropology. Within this position Keesing distinguishes three main 
approaches to the study of culture, or three different ways of describing and understanding culture 
as a system of ideas: the cognitivist, the structuralist and the interpretive. The three approaches are 
not necessarily exclusive, rather they highlight different aspects of the phenomenon of culture as a 
system of ideas. 
Culture as a cognitive system is viewed as a system of knowledge that determines behavior. 
Ward Goodenough expresses this view in the following way: “A society’s culture consists of 
whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its 
members. Culture is not a material phenomenon; it does not consist of things, people, behavior, or 
emotions. It is rather the organization of these things. It is the form of things that people have in 
mind, their models for perceiving, relating, and otherwise interpreting them” (Goodenough 
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1957:167, Cultural Anthropology and Linguistics; see also Culture, Language and Society, 1971). In this 
case culture is determined by the biological functions of cognition, which are, presumably, 
universal. This approach to culture, dubbed “ethnoscience”, proposes the construction of a 
“grammar of culture” comprising all the native categories of thought as constituted in particular 
places: “From elementary “units of meaning” (equivalent to phonemes, the elementary units of 
meaningful sound), a cultural grammar for normatively constituting the world could be disinterred: 
from elementary terms for kinsfolk, plants and diseases, say to the lineaments of social life” 
(Rapport and Overing 2000:52). 
The cognitivist approach borrows much from the structuralist approach based on the 
work of Claude Lévi-Strauss. For Lévi-Strauss, culture is a symbolic system created by the mind. 
Thus, if we understand how the mind works, then we can understand how culture as a symbolic 
system is constructed and how meaning is created within it. Lévi-Strauss argues that all subsystems 
of culture have the same underlying structure, since they are all brought into being by the 
processes of the mind. Thus, language, kinship, totemism, myth, all share the same underlying 
structure. Lévi-Strauss’ ideas derive from linguistics and his analysis parallels Saussure’s analysis of 
the structure of language. Lévi-Struass concentrated on the study of myth because, according to 
him, myth is the most pure creation of the mind, it reflects the works of the mind in the most pure 
form, it is closer to the unconscious (quote from LS). Analyzing a vast corpus of myths from 
South America, he showed that the elements that constitute a myth (different for each particular 
group) are ordered in a series of relationships of opposition and complementarity that reflect how 
humans think about the world and bring order and meaning to it. This constitutes the underlying 
structure of the myth and of mythical thought, and is also reflected in other realms of life – 
kinship, art, religion, politics, economics – since it is through the same processes of mind that all 
realms of life are ordered and acquire meaning. Thus, each culture provides a pattern of 
organization of different elements (derived from each particular context) that reflects a common 
underlying structure. They differ at the symbolic level, given the social, material and historic 
contexts particular to each group, but they are similar at the structural level since the processes of 
mind are universal. Lévi-Strauss’ ideas derive from linguistics, and his analysis parallels Saussure’s 
analysis of the structure of language. 
Geertz favors a semiotic concept of culture, but resists the formal approach of the 
cognitivists and the structuralists. Instead he proposes “interpretation” as the key to the 
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understanding of culture: “Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be 
therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of 
meaning” (Geertz, 1973:5). Thus, he proposes that a culture can only be known through a detailed 
description, which involves interpretation, of the different layers of significance. Borrowing from 
the philosopher Gilbert Ryle, he calls this process “thick description”. This, he argues, is what 
ethnography is about and what defines anthropology as a social science. Thus, he puts emphasis 
on the particular context (both temporal and spatial) of cultural symbols rather than on the 
universal underlying structure that orders culture. Meaning for Geertz lies primarily in the 
symbolic context. 
For Geertz, acts (e.g., a wink) are signs that can only be properly understood in the context 
within which they occur through “thick description”. The laws of cognition will not help us in 
understanding the acts of people in specific cultures, what we need is “familiarity with the 
imaginative universe within which their acts are signs” (Geertz 1973:13, follows Wittgenstein). 
Neither does structuralism bring us any closer to understanding culture, since meaning is 
constructed each time through the action of individuals in particular contexts and not at some 
abstract, deep, structural level: “Behavior must be attended to, and with some exactness, because it 
is through the flow of behavior – or, more precisely, social action – that cultural forms find 
articulation. They find it as well, of course, in various sorts of artifacts, and various states of 
consciousness; but these draw their meaning from the role they play (Wittgenstein would say their 
“use”) in an ongoing pattern of life, not from any intrinsic relationships they bear to one another” 
(Geertz, 1973:17). Culture is public because meaning is public, symbols acquire meaning in the 
context of social relationships in particular moments in time and place. Meaning is permanently 
being constructed within particular cultures; symbols are inherently ambiguous thus meaning is 
never fixed. In turn, the process of construction of meaning has the ability to transform the 
culture that guided the process in the first place.  
This brings us to the relationship between culture and action, an aspect of the more 
general question in social theory about the relationship between society and the individual. 
Culture, as a particularizing concept, “came to the fore in the study of nation states as general 
developmental theories originating in the European Enlightenment have proved less and less 
complete and often inapplicable” (Austin-Broos, 1987:xxii). The failure of general theories of 
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progress, neo-classical or marxist, to explain the processes of modernization in Third World 
nations promoted a more particularistic approach to the analysis of beliefs, strategies and 
institutions, the idea being that particular societies have specific logics of development derived 
from their particular cultures (Austin-Broos, 1987). 
The notion predominant nowadays is that of culture as a system of ideas through which 
people attribute meaning to the world around them and to their actions. The question is how does 
culture translate into action? How does it guide behavior and to what extent? There are two 
general approaches to the problem of the interaction between the individual and society. One, 
more modern, emphasizes the capacity of the agent (the individual) to act creatively and 
independently of the structural constraints represented by society. Thus, it concentrates on the 
ways that individual action transforms culture. Geertz’s view of culture as a symbolic system 
favors this position since it emphasizes the view of culture as a system in constant transformation, 
under a constant process of construction in which the individual has a prominent role. This 
position has been advanced more recently through discussions about individual creativity and 
imagination. The other, more traditional, follows Durkheim’s proposition that collective 
representations (conscience collective) have an independent existence and endure over and above the 
actions of particular individuals (Durkheim, 1895). These collective representations constrain, and 
even exercise coercion over, the actions of individuals, determining individual behavior and 
“lending to individuals’ acts a certain social and cultural regularity” (Rapport and Overing, 2000:1). 
This position underlies the “values paradigm” that assumes that “culture shapes action by 
supplying ultimate ends or values toward which action is directed, thus making values the central 
causal element of culture” (Swindler, 1986:273). 
The values paradigm derives from Weber (1946). Weber argued that religious beliefs 
reflected in the Protestant “ethos” had a momentary historical fit with capitalist norms of action, 
resulting in an “elective affinity”. In time, capitalism emancipated from its religious supports (the 
Protestant ethos) and in turn helped to corrode them. With modernity came the dissolution of the 
religious-ethos that was once bound to capitalism. Within this line of analysis religious beliefs are 
independent from capitalism as a phenomenon. They are not functionally derived from the 
economic structure of life as Marx proposed. There is nothing about capitalism as an economic 
system itself that can explain the capitalist “ethos”. 
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Religious beliefs were a factor in the emergence of capitalism, but Weber is not a mono-
causal theorist (in the way that Marx is). What he proposes is a temporal fit between a multitude of 
factors that led to the rise of capitalism. He explains the role of religious beliefs while Marx 
describes the role of other factors such as class and the structure of production. Economic 
systems are thus interlaced with social meaning. Weber is not as much interested in explaining 
causality as he is interested in interpreting the meaning of social action, its significance to the 
actors themselves, the meaningfulness that holds together the world of the social actor. He does 
not say that Protestantism caused Capitalism, he is interested in the ways that Protestantism 
influenced Capitalism or the things that it can explain about it, in other words, the affinity between 
them (“elective affinity”) and how the two phenomena work together. It does not mean that 
Capitalism would not have evolved without Protestantism, it probably would have in another form 
(as it did before in the case of the Florentine Merchants). One could say that Protestantism 
“shaped” Capitalism. 
Weber was interested in both the “lifeworld” of individuals, their values, ideas and 
intentions, and the impersonal forces, rules, laws and institutions that drive the individual and 
constitute a “system”. Individuals don’t just act in response to external forces of the system, their 
actions need to be meaningful to them. Human beings crave for meaning, their actions are 
directed towards finding the ultimate meaning of life and are motivated, at least partly, by this 
concern.  
Weber describes four different conceptions of rationality that explains action or gives it 
meaning: instrumental/functional (means-end), value rationality (religious ideas, nationalism, etc), 
affectual rationality (affects and feelings), and traditional rationality (habituation, “borderline” as a 
category of meaningful action). It is only possible to know which one applies in each particular 
circumstance through interpretation. Thus, in his view, people don’t only respond to a means-end 
rationality, what economists traditionally call rationality. Rationality as an “ideal type” (a category 
of analysis) that explains action and constitutes culture is a broader concept in Weber’s view. 
Values, affects, feelings and traditions are as important as rationality in the economists’ sense when 
we delve into the meaning of actions. 
Various attempts have been made since Weber to incorporate the notion of the contextual 
or processual nature of culture, making space for individual, creative action. For example, see 
Parsons’ theory of social action and pattern variables (Parsons 1977) (and Parsons’ Voluntaristic 
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theory of action, 1937, especially summary chapter, 697-726) or Bourdieu’s theory of practice and the 
habitus (Bourdieu 1977). 
2.2. Data and Empirical Approach 
The main source of our data on beliefs and values across countries is the World Values 
Survey Series. We use data on the first three waves (1981-84, 1990-92, 1995-97). We could not use 
data from a fourth wave in 00-04 since the majority of our core questions were not available (and 
for the smaller European Values Survey in 1999 where related questions are asked their wording 
and answer categories change significantly). In total the WVS interviewed a random sample of 
168,482 people in 64 nations. The appendix contains more information about this survey. We use 
data on a subset of the people who answered the relevant questions. The countries in our sample 
are given in Table A. 
The WVS has data available on a large variety of opinions on beliefs and values (positive 
statements about how the world works) and values (normative statements on how the world 
should work). Alternatively, beliefs can be thought of as the combination of the available 
information with a set of more stable individual values (that condition the acceptance/rejection of 
particular arguments). We will use the two  words interchangeably. A challenge of our approach is 
to select out of these opinions an appropriate set to study. We study beliefs on issues that are 
economically relevant. We also select a set of non-economic beliefs and values as a benchmark. 
Thus, our study is focused on two “cultural domains”, namely economic and non-economic.  
2.2.1. Economic Beliefs  
There is a vast literature in political science discussing the nature of political beliefs (e.g., 
de Tocqueville (1955), Lipset (1979), inter alia; see also the discussions in Rokeach (1973), Feldman 
(1988), Inglehart (1990) and Zaller (1991)). Some of this work emphasizes how left right political 
choices reflect the basic cleavages in society. Lipset and Rokkan (1967), for example, argue for the 
importance of the religious and the class (or economic) cleavage. A large part of the variation in 
the latter that explains party choice can be captured by an individual’s belief concerning three basic 
economic questions: 
(1) Beliefs concerning the role that individual needs should play in determining income 
(2) Beliefs concerning the role of merit in determining income, and 
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(3) Beliefs concerning how desirable is private ownership of property. 
We use five different World Values questions to capture these different dimensions of ideology, 
starting with the role of needs as captured by attitudes towards poverty. Three survey questions 
ask about attitudes towards poverty and inequality. They are as follows: 
1a. “Why, in your opinion, are there people in this country who live in need? Here are 
two opinions: which comes closest to your view?” The two relevant options are “1. They 
are poor because of laziness and lack of willpower, OR 2. They are poor because society 
treats them unfairly.” 
 
1b. “In your opinion, do most poor people in this country have a chance of escaping 
from poverty, or there is very little chance of escaping?”  The two options are “(1) They 
have a chance or (2) There is very little chance.” 
 
1c. “Do you think that what the government is doing for people in poverty in this 
country is about the right amount, too much, or too little?” The options are “(1) Too 
much or (2) About the right amount, or (3) Too little.” 
 
Turning attention to individual beliefs concerning how desirable is private ownership of property, 
we use the answer to the question: 
1d. “There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which 
of these four statements comes closest to your opinion? (1) The owners should run their 
business or appoint the managers; (2) The owners and the employees should participate in the 
selection of managers. (3) The government should be the owner and appoint the managers; 
(4) The employees should own the business and should elect the managers.”  
 
Finally, we turn attention to the role of merit in determining income (interpreting merit as 
payment in proportion to individual output). The following question appears to address the beliefs 
concerning this issue: 
1e. “Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds 
out that the other earns considerably more than she does. The better-paid secretary, 
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however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it (1) 
fair or (2) not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other?” 
 
From (1a) we define the variable called Unfair for Poor-L which equals 0 if the answer is category (1) 
and 1 if the answer is category (2). The dummy, No Escape–L, is defined similarly using (1b). 
Government help Poor-L is a variable measured on a cardinal 1-3 scale based on the responses to 
question (1c). The variable Business Ownership-L is defined over a cardinal 1-4 scale based on the 
responses to (1d). Finally from the last question (1e) we define the dummy, Fair Pay-L, which 
equals 0 if the answer is category (1) and 1 if the answer is category (2). The extension L indicates 
that under the natural interpretation of the corresponding variable, higher values are associated 
with a more left wing ideological placement.   
2.2.2. Non-Economic Beliefs  
It is less clear from the literature discussed at the start of this chapter how the core set of 
“moral” beliefs that drive left and right choices can be described. Political scientists have argued 
for the increasing importance of values that emphasize a libertarian/authoritarian dimension as 
well as “post materialist” values that focus on quality of life (rather than economic preservation). 
See Inglehart and Klingemann (1976), Flanagan (1987), Kitschelt (1994), inter alia. For example, a 
representative recent paper is Knutsen and Kumlin (2003) who identify three central (non-
economic) values used in party choice. These are as follows: 
(1) Beliefs concerning how desirable is the environment/ecology versus growth 
(2) Beliefs about the importance of moral values (religious versus secular), 
(3) Beliefs concerning how desirable is a libertarian versus authoritarian type of society.  
We use five different World Values questions to capture these different dimensions of moral 
ideology, starting with ecology versus growth orientation beliefs. Two World Values survey 
questions appear related to these attitudes. They are as follows: 
 
2a. “Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment 
and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view? (1) 
Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic 
  13 
growth and some loss of jobs. (2) Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top 
priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.” 
 
2b. “For the following pair of statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your 
own views.” The options are “(1) We should emphasize tradition more than high 
technology, OR (2) We should emphasize high technology more than tradition.” 
It is not so clear how to find survey questions that help to separately capture the other two 
dimensions of non-economic beliefs: (i.e., moral values and libertarian/authoritarian tendencies). 
The question below appears to more heavily focus on the first: 
2c. “Please tell me if homosexuality can always be justified, never be justified or something 
in between, using this card.” Card shows a scale from 1 to 10 where “(1)=Never justifiable, 
(10)=Always justifiable.” 
The following questions appear to focus both on libertarian/authoritarian beliefs and also 
on the moral dimension: 
2d. “For the following pair of statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your 
own views. (1) To build good human relationships it is most important to try to 
understand other's preferences OR (2) To build good human relationships it is most 
important to express one's own preferences clearly.” 
2e. “I’d like to ask you about some groups that some people feel are threatening to the 
social and political order of society. Would you please select from the following list the one 
group or organization that you like least? (1) Jews (2) Capitalists (3) Stalinists/hard line 
communists (or country equivalent) (4) Immigrants (5) Homosexuals (6) Criminals (7) 
Neo-Nazis/Right extremists (or country equivalents).” 
We use (2a) to define the variable, Environment-L, that equals 0 if the respondent says that 
‘economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers’ 
and equals 1 if the response is that ‘protecting the environment should be given priority.’ (Again 
the extension L indicates that under the natural interpretation of the corresponding variable, 
higher values are associated with a more left-wing ideological placement). From (2b) we define the 
variable called Tradition vs Technology-R in which traditionalists are assigned the value 1 and 
  14 
technologists the value 0 (higher values here may not unambiguously reflect leftist/rightist 
ideology since although conservative right wingers are often traditionalists insofar as moral issues 
are concerned, technology that seeks to dominate nature may be rejected by leftists). From (2c) we 
define the variable, Homosexuals-L, which corresponds to the 10 (cardinal) response categories 
given in that question. We use (2d) to define the variable, Tolerance-L, that equals 1 if the 
respondent says that ‘to build good human relationships it is most important to try to understand 
other's preferences’ and equals 0 if the response is that one should express ‘one's own preferences 
clearly’. Finally from (2e) we define a new variable called Capitalists-L that equals 1 if the 
respondent says that they like capitalists the least and 0 otherwise. 
3. Results 1: The Structure of Beliefs 
3.1. Economic Beliefs 
Figure 1 in the appendix shows how the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of responses to each 
of these questions vary across five major regions of the world: USA, South America, Asia, Europe 
and the Former Communist Countries. We also report the results for three African countries 
(Ghana, South Africa and Nigeria) in the text. 
The most striking feature of the percentiles is that for both questions (1a) and (1b) over 
50% of respondents in the USA and Asia believe that people are in need due to laziness and also 
that it is possible to escape poverty. By contrast over half of people in South America, Europe, the 
former communist countries and Africa tend to blame unfairness of society for being in need and 
believe that people have little chance of getting out of poverty.  For example in the USA and Asia, 
60.0% and 51.2%, respectively, of people blame laziness, whereas 80.7% of former-Communists, 
77.8% of Europeans, 71.7% of Africans and 64.5% of South Americans blame an unfair society. 
And whereas 70.8% of Americans and 68.8% of Asians believe that there is a chance of escaping 
poverty, only 26.1% of people from the former Communist countries, 40.0% of Africans, 41.9% 
of South Americans and 45.0% of Europeans believe this to be so. The results for whether the 
government should help the poor show not dissimilar patterns. At one end, 60.0% of Americans 
believe that the poor are already receiving either too much help or the right amount (despite of the 
relatively high level of inequality in their country). At the other end, 70.9% of Africans, 69.7% of 
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Europeans, 67.9% of South Americans and 85.3 % of former Communists report that they are 
getting too little help from the Government. 
With respect to the question of whether it is fair for an efficient secretary to be paid more 
than an inefficient one, a significant majority of respondents (over 75%) across all regions of the 
world, with the exception of Europe and Africa, believe that it is fair. In Europe and Africa, 30.5% 
and 29.5% of people say that it is not fair. Views on who should run businesses show a wide 
spread of beliefs varying from a high degree of consensus that owners should appoint managers, 
possibly with the participation of workers in the United States (91.6%) to former Communists of 
whom only 59.9% hold such a belief. In between are the Europeans, Africans, South Americans 
and Asians where the proportions are 86.0%, 85.0%, 79.7% and 78.0%, respectively.  
3.2. Factor Analysis on Economic Beliefs 
Since the same sort of people may be inclined to answer the above questions similarly, we 
may be able to capture most of the variation in the answers by a smaller set of variables. For 
example, those people who believe that there is little chance of escaping from poverty may be the 
same individuals who also believe that people are in need due to society being unfair and that the 
government should do more to help them. In other words, the responses to these questions may 
be highly correlated and simply reflect the one ‘core’ characteristic of an individual. This also 
becomes a problem when we try to identify which of these different beliefs is most important for 
determining economic performance (see chapter 4).4 
As a first approach to address these kinds of issues, Table 1a shows the correlation 
coefficients between all of our five variables. The combinations with the strongest positive 
correlations are Unfair for Poor-L and No Escape-L (equal to 0.39), Unfair for Poor-L and Government 
help Poor-L (equal to 0.36) and No Escape-L and Government help Poor-L (equal to 0.32). The 
correlations of these three variables with Business Ownership-L and Fair Pay-L are weaker, but still 
significantly positive in most cases. The exceptions are between Fair Pay-L and No Escape-L as well 
as between Fair Pay-L and Government help Poor-L both of which are (weakly) negatively correlated 
(equal to -0.01 and -0.03, respectively). 
                                                 
4 Formally, it introduces the possibility of multi-collinearity into regression equations that use sets of beliefs as 
explanatory variables. 
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Second, we also seek to uncover how many independent sources of variation exist across 
all our measures of beliefs by undertaking a principal components analysis. This method amounts 
to finding orthogonal linear combinations (called ‘principal components’) of our five variables that 
can account for the maximum amount of variability in our original set of variables. Say, for 
example, it turns out that two principal components can account for nearly all of the variation in 
economic beliefs and if, by looking at the coefficients, we can identify them as a 
poverty/inequality component and an efficiency component. Then we can argue that there are 
only two important ‘latent’ variables, or ‘core’ beliefs, inherent to each person that account for all 
variations in how they answer a multitude of different types of questions that are all related to 
these topics. In other words, although not guaranteed, it may be that the (uncorrelated) principal 
components that account for most of the variation in our set of beliefs reveal different sub-groups 
of beliefs that can be given an economic interpretation.5 
Table 1b indicates that two factors are able to explain 56% of the total variation in 
responses and three factors are able to explain 75%. Retaining two factors, we are able to obtain 
the factor loadings: that is, how much weight each factor gives to each of the five component 
variables, Unfair for Poor-L, No Escape-L, Government help Poor-L, Business Ownership-L and Fair Pay-L. 
Table 1c shows the factor loadings. They are: 
 
Factor 1 = 0.77Unfair for Poor-L + 0.75No Escape-L + 0.73Government help Poor-L  
+ 0.27Business Ownership-L - 0.06Fair Pay-L  (1) 
 
Factor 2 = 0.06Unfair for Poor-L - 0.02No Escape-L - 0.09Government help Poor-L 
+ 0.47Business Ownership-L + 0.89Fair Pay-L (2) 
 
The first factor is marked by especially high loadings on Unfair for Poor-L, No-Escape-L and 
Government help Poor-L whereas the second factor is marked by especially high loadings on Business 
                                                 
5 The principal components are computed as follows: consider a vector, x, comprised of a set of variables x1, x2, .. xn 
with covariance matrix, V. We want to find a linear function α′x that has maximum variance subject to α′α=1. This 
implies solving |V-λI|=0. The maximum characteristic root of V is the required maximum value and the 
corresponding characteristic vector is the required α. Write the roots (or ‘eigenvalues’) in decreasing order: λ1, λ2, .., λn 
and let the corresponding eigenvectors be α1, α2, .., αn. Then the ‘principal components’ of the xi’s are the linear 
functions: z1=α1′x, z2=α2′x, …, zn=αn′x. Then V(z1)=α1′Vα1=λ1, V(z2)=α2′Vα2=λ2, .., V(zn)=αn′Vαn=λn. The principal 
components have the following properties: Σi var(zi)=Σi λi=Trace(V) =Σi var(xi) and the variables, zi, are orthogonal. 
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Ownership-L and Fair Pay-L. Consequently we can conclude that the economic attributes of being 
‘lefty’ are composed (statistically) of two aspects. 
The first emphasizes beliefs concerning poverty and the role that individual needs should 
play in determining income (captured by Factor 1). The second emphasizes the role of merit in 
determining income and attitudes about the desirability of private ownership of property (captured 
by Factor 2). The answers to our two survey questions relating to the potentially different 
attributes of merit and private ownership (i.e., Business Ownership-L and Fair Pay-L) are not 
sufficiently independent to allow us to identify separate factors emphasizing each of them 
individually. It remains possible that finer survey questions could show that there is independent 
variation amongst people over these two attributes. On the other hand, there may always remain 
high degrees of overlap between them in the sense that without private ownership claims to 
property it may be hard to ever create a meritocracy, making answers to questions about these two 
attributes potentially always hard to distinguish. 
3.3. Non-Economic Beliefs 
Figure 2 in the appendix shows how the percentiles of responses to all these questions vary 
across the USA, South America, Asia, Europe and the Former Communist Countries. The issue of 
whether the environment or the economy that should be given priority shows a high degree of 
uniformity across the regions of the world (with the exception of Africa). In all of these regions 
between 54.0% and 60.1% of people say that the environment should be given priority, whereas in 
Africa the number is only 35.5% (perhaps reflecting the priority of development). Regards the 
related question of whether it is tradition or technology that is more important, the responses 
range from a relatively high proportion of Americans who declare themselves to be traditionalists 
(i.e., 61.5%) to a substantially lower proportion of Asians (i.e., 28.7%). Former-communists and 
Europeans are more evenly split (54.1% and 49.4%, respectively).  
The most conservative set of beliefs on whether homosexuality is justifiable occurs in Asia 
and Africa where 71.2% and 70.0%, respectively, say that it is never justifiable (i.e., a “1” on a 1 to 
10 scale). At the other end of the scale are the Europeans of whom only 41.0% believe this to be 
so. With respect to whose preferences matter, the most selfish region of the world appears to be 
South America where 53.8% believe that their own are most important. Moreover South 
Americans have the highest proportion of people (i.e., 19.4%) who dislike capitalists (compared to 
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other groups). The lowest proportions are in Europe (6.2%) and, surprisingly, the former 
Communist countries where just 4.3% like capitalists even less than Jews, Stalinists, immigrants, 
homosexuals, criminals and neo-nazi/right extremists. 
3.4. Factor Analysis on Non-Economic Beliefs 
In this section we test whether most of the variation in the set of responses to the 
questions on non-economic beliefs can be captured by a smaller set of variables, using the same 
methodology as used for the set of economic beliefs. In the present case the same people who 
believe, for example, that homosexuality is never justifiable may also be the ones who think that 
tradition is most important and others’ preferences are not so important to take into 
consideration. These beliefs may all reflect one common ‘core’ characteristic of an individual. We 
would also like to know whether the patterns in the responses reveal the existence of categories 
that correspond to our priors about which questions are asking about similar beliefs. 
Table 2a shows the correlation coefficients between all these five variables. They are all 
now much weaker than the previous set. The combinations with the strongest positive correlations 
are between Tradition vs Technology-R and Environment-L (=0.08), Tradition vs Technology-R and 
Tolerance-L (equal to 0.06), Tolerance-L and Homosexuals-L (=0.06), Environment-L and Tolerance-L 
(equal to 0.08) and Environment-L and Homosexuals-L (=0.08). The correlations between the other 
variables are all relatively small. 
To check how many independent sources of variation exist across our five measures, Table 
2b reports that two factors are able to explain 44% of the total variation in responses and three 
factors are able to explain 64%. Retaining three factors, we are able to obtain the factor loadings: 
that is, how much weight each factor gives to each of the five component variables, Tradition vs 
Technology-R, Environment -L, Capitalists–L, Tolerance-L and Homosexuals-L. 
Table 2c reports the factor loadings the rotated factor loadings. They are as follows: 
 
Factor 1 = 0.40 Environment-L - 0.19Tradition vs Technology-R + 0.83Homosexuals-L  
+0.44Tolerance-L + 0.06Capitalists-L   (3) 
 
Factor 2 = 0.06Environment-L + 0.05Tradition vs Technology-R + 0.09Homosexuals-L 
  - 0.36Tolerance-L + 0.93Capitalists-L  (4) 
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Factor 3 = 0.53Environment-L + 0.82Tradition vs Technology-R - 0.16Homosexuals-L  
 + 0.34Tolerance-L + 0.05Capitalists-L  (5) 
 
Factor 3 is marked by particularly high loadings on both Environment-L and Tradition vs 
Technology-R and Factor 2 has a very high loading on one variable: Capitalists–L. The highest 
loading by far for Factor 1 is on Homosexuals-L and the next highest is on Tolerance-L. All three 
factors have moderately high weightings on Tolerance-L. Consequently we have a measure of 
evidence that the non-economic attributes of being ‘lefty’ are composed (statistically) of three 
aspects. 
One emphasizes beliefs concerning the desirability of improving the environment and 
ecology of the nation versus concentrating on the economy and technology (captured by Factor 3) 
whereas the other two emphasize libertarian versus authoritarian beliefs (captured by Factor 2) and 
also the importance of moral values (captured by Factor 1). Our variable, Tolerance-L, that 
measures the extent to which we should try to understand others, appears to be correlated both 
with libertarian and moral beliefs, as well as with views regarding the importance of protecting the 
environment from being destroyed. 
4. Results 2: Beliefs and Economic Performance 
 
4.1. Economic Beliefs and Growth 
In this section of the project we use our survey measures of both economic and non-
economics beliefs and values to study how they affect economic performance. We focus on both 
how much the average values of these attributes influence performance (i.e., how right or left the 
populace of the nation is) and also on how much the degree of disagreement amongst people 
affects performance (i.e., how different these attitudes are across the populace). 
4.1.1. Cross-section Results 
We first report some cross-section correlations between average (Purchasing Power Parity 
Adjusted) GDP growth rates between 1980 and 1997 and economic beliefs over this period. 
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Cardinality of the response categories to the survey questions is assumed.6 Figure 3a shows how 
the GDP growth rate varies with beliefs regarding why people live in need. There appears to be a 
strong negative relationship whereby those countries with low rates of growth are associated with   
the (leftist) belief that people are poor because have been treated unfairly by society (i.e., are not 
lazy). A robust regression of GDP growth on the belief variable, controlling for outliers, shows a 
negative coefficient on Unfair for Poor-L that is significant at the 1 per cent level.7  
Similarly, Figure 3b shows evidence of a negative link between economic performance and 
leftist beliefs that there is little or no chance of escaping from poverty. The robust regression of 
growth on No Escape-L shows a negative coefficient, again significant at the 1 per cent level.8 Very 
similar results are also found between economic performance and leftist belief that the 
government is doing too little to help the poor (see Figure 3c). With respect to the last two sets of 
beliefs about how business should be managed (ranging from the owners to the employees) and 
whether a more efficient secretary should (not) be paid more, there appear to be no obvious 
relationships looking at figures 3d-e. Cross-section regressions support this view evidence. The 
coefficients on Business Ownership-L and Fair Pay-L are negative and positive, respectively, although 
both are insignificant. 
These correlations suggest that leftist economic beliefs may be leading to lower rates of 
growth. This could be occurring through either of two mechanisms. First, people may be voting 
for policies and institutions that exert greater control over the economy. Second, even after 
controlling for institutions and policies, leftist beliefs may be having a direct negative effect 
independent of what the government is doing (for example, if people believe that it is almost impossible to 
escape from poverty and experience a sense of unfairness, they may try less hard at work and be 
less productive irrespective of what the government is doing). In the next section we control for 
measures of institutional quality (as well as trade and geography) and also run random effects 
regressions to better try to identify the impact of beliefs on economic performance. 
                                                 
6 For example, if there are two categories then we assign the responses the values 0 and 1, and then take the weighted 
average. In this case the average corresponds to the proportion of people in the second category. If there are three 
categories then we take the weighted average over the three values: 0, 1 and 2. 
7 The coefficient equals 0.12 (standard error=0.04). Number of observations=40, Prob.>F=0.01. 
8 The coefficient equals -0.06 (standard error=0.02). Number of observations=40, Prob.>F=0.01. 
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4.1.2. Panel Regression Results 
In Table 3a we report the first set of results where the observations are at the country-year 
level. The standard errors have been corrected to take account of unobserved random (country) 
effects. In the first three columns, more leftist economic beliefs about the reasons for being poor 
(laziness versus unfairness), the perceived likelihood of escaping from poverty and whether the 
government should be doing more to help the poor are all associated with lower growth rates, at 
the 1 per cent level of significance. The sizes of the effects are large. For example a one standard 
deviation change in beliefs about why people are poor (corresponding to shifting 14.8 percentage 
points of the population) is predicted to explain 25.4 percent of the standard deviation in growth 
rates. With respect to the likelihood of escaping from poverty, a one standard deviation change 
(corresponding to 19.4 percentage points of the population) is predicted to explain 19.4 percent of 
the standard deviation in growth rates. 
Columns (4-5) suggest that the leftist belief about more employee/state control is 
associated with significantly lower growth rates although emphasizing fairness of pay (rather than 
rewards for better job performance) has a positive effect on growth rates. This latter effect could 
be associated with the importance of efficiency wages (i.e., paying someone less for doing 
practically the same job could lead to morale problems and declines in overall efficiency. The 
economic benefits accruing to firms by avoiding two-tier wage systems has been emphasized, inter 
alia, by Fehr and Kirchsteiger (1994). In column (6) we regress the rate of growth on the two 
factors identified in the previous section as capturing most of the overall variation in beliefs. 
Factor 1 emphasizes beliefs concerning poverty and the role that individual needs should play in 
determining income whereas factor 2 emphasizes the role of merit in determining income and 
attitudes about the desirability of private ownership of property. The former has a strong 
(negative) effect at the 1 per cent level whereas the latter is insignificant. 
Table 3b adds an additional set of country level control variables. The idea is to try to 
identify whether the effect of beliefs on economic performance are occurring directly as opposed 
to indirectly via their impact on trade, policies and institutions. We therefore include controls for 
the initial level of GDP (to take account of convergence), colonial legal origins (which proxy for 
institutional quality) and openness to trade. We also include each country’s latitude (since 
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geography has been argued to be a key determinant of growth). Since our measure is the absolute 
value of latitude, this variable is highly correlated with the country’s distance from the equator.9  
Column (1) suggests that countries that start off with relatively low levels of GDP tend to 
grow faster than countries with initially high levels (i.e., they tend to converge toward each other). 
Greater openness tends to be associated with higher levels of growth and of the legal origin 
dummies, the main impediment to better economic performance is socialist legal structures (the 
base category if French). Socialist origins decrease growth rates by around 5 percentage points per 
annum. In terms of geography, countries further away from the equator tend to grow faster. 
Importantly, even after controlling for the above set of variables the results indicate that when 
beliefs are more leftist (in the sense that being poor is attributed to unfairness rather than laziness) 
there is a significant (at the 1 per cent level) and sizeable impact on economic performance. The 
size of its coefficient remains very similar to the value reported in Table 3a (that did not contain 
any controls). Similarly in columns (2-3) No-Escape-L and Government help Poor-L both retain 
negative effects on growth, at the 1 per cent level, of almost the same magnitude to before. 
However once our set of macroeconomic controls is included in columns (4-5) we no longer find 
effects for leftists belief about more employee/state control of business and fairness of pay scales. 
In the last column national growth rates are regressed on the two factors identified in 
Section 2.2 as capturing (orthogonal) dimensions of economic beliefs (Factor 1=0.77Unfair for 
Poor-L+0.75No Escape-L+0.73Government help Poor-L+0.27Business Ownership-L-0.06Fair Pay-L and 
Factor 2=0.06 Unfair for Poor-L-0.02No Escape-L-0.09Government help Poor-L+0.47Business Ownership-
L+0.89Fair Pay-L). The first factor (about beliefs concerning poverty and the role that individual 
needs should play in determining income) has strong negative and significant effects on economic 
performance whereas the second one does not. 
                                                 
9 We also experimented with other measures of institutional quality such as colonial origins and settler mortality (see 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001)), civil war, freedom (i.e., political rights and civil liberties) and also 
educational levels. The results on our (belief) variables of interest all remain similar.  
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4.2. Non-Economic Beliefs and Growth 
4.2.1. Cross-section Results 
Figures 4a-e show how the GDP growth rates vary with our series of non-economic 
beliefs. There appears to be little evidence of any strong relationships, with the possible exception 
of beliefs about whether it is tradition or technology that should be emphasized. A robust 
regression of GDP growth on the belief that technology should be downplayed in favour of 
tradition shows a negative and significant relationship.10 None of the coefficients on other belief 
variables achieve significance levels below the 5 per cent level.  
4.2.2. Panel Regression Results 
Table 4a reports a set of (random effects) growth regressions on our set of non-economic 
beliefs. Apart from beliefs about the importance of tradition versus technology, none of the other 
variables achieve significance below the 5 percent level. Being a traditionalist (which is usually 
associated with being more rightist in the sense of preferring the conservation of existing norms) 
appears harmful to economic performance. This appears to be in striking contrast to the other 
rightist economic belief variables (i.e., Unfair for Poor-L, No Escape-L and Government help Poor-L) 
that were strongly associated with higher growth rates. Consequently the regression evidence 
suggests that there may be one element of right-wing/conservatism ideology associated with a 
reluctance to embrace change that can actually hold back a nation’s growth potential. In that last 
column (6)  national growth rates are regressed on the three factors identified in Section 2.4 as 
capturing (orthogonal) dimensions of non-economic beliefs (Factor 1=0.40Environment-L-
0.19Tradition vs Technology-R+0.83Homosexuals-L+0.44Tolerance-L+0.06Capitalists-L; Factor 2=0.06 
Environment-L+0.05Tradition vs Technology-R+0.09Homosexuals-L-0.36Tolerance-L+0.93Capitalists-L; 
Factor 3=0.53Environment-L+0.82Tradition vs Technology-R-0.16Homosexuals-L+0.34Tolerance-L+0.05 
Capitalists-L). Only the third factor (about the desirability of improving the environment and 
ecology versus concentrating on the economy and technology) has a negative and significant effect 
on growth. 
Table 4b adds the set of country level controls. The results again suggest that growth rates 
are associated negatively with the initial level of GDP, positively with openness and negatively 
                                                 
10 The coefficient equals -0.10 (standard error=0.04). Number of observations=39, Prob.>F=0.01. 
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with socialist legal structures. (Absolute) latitude loses significance in most of these specifications. 
The main result from the previous table remains robust: a belief that tradition is more important 
than technology has a negative and significant effect (at the 1 per cent level) on economic 
performance. The size of its coefficient also stays the same. In the last column it is the third factor 
(which is weighted most heavily on Tradition vs Technology) that is the only one with an identifiable 
impact on growth.11 
4.2.3. The Dispersion of Beliefs and Growth 
Up until now, we have sought to find a relation between average beliefs and GDP growth. 
That is, we have been asking whether more left-wing economic or non-economic beliefs affect 
performance (independent of policies and institutions). It is also possible that the higher order 
moments, such as measures of the dispersion of beliefs, are important. Dispersion of beliefs may 
lead, for example, to uncertainty about what others believe and lead to different economic 
outcomes had everyone held very similar beliefs. 
This possibility arises from a small theoretical literature that has recently examined how the 
equilibria of incomplete information games vary with “higher order beliefs” (i.e., players’ beliefs 
about other players beliefs, players’ beliefs about other players’ beliefs about other players’ beliefs, 
and so on). Higher order beliefs may play an important role in some economic phenomena. It has 
been reported that, following the Asian crisis, some of the investors who withdrew their capital 
from Brazil, did so not because they over-estimated the economic linkages between Asia and 
Brazil, but because they thought others might do so. It seems that apparently irrelevant news 
about the economy may lead some firms to reduce their investments (and start a recession), not 
because they think that the news is relevant, but because they think others may think so. Applied 
modellers (for example, Morris and Shin (1998)) have taken such reports seriously. 
In Table 5a we explain growth rates with our set of aggregate level control variables (GDP 
1975-1980, Trade: Openness, Institutions: Legal Origins and Geography: Latitude) as well as with the 
means and standard deviations of our set of economic belief variables. In column (2) both the 
mean and standard deviation of leftist beliefs regarding the likelihood of escaping from poverty 
                                                 
11 We also ran specifications with other combinations of controls including colonial origins, settler mortality, civil war, 
level of freedom and educational levels. The coefficients on these (belief) variables remained similar. 
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has a negative impact on economic performance at the 1 per cent level. However the dispersion of 
other types of beliefs appears to have little effect. In the last column only the level of the first 
economic factor, which is a weighted average of our three beliefs that relate to poverty (Unfair for 
Poor–L, No Escape–L and Government help Poor–L) is significant (see also column (6) of Table 3a). 
Consequently the evidence suggests that conflicting views, disagreements and potential uncertainty 
about what others believe with respect to economic matters are not necessarily correlated with a 
nation’s rate of GDP growth.  
Similarly with respect to our set of non-economic attributes (see Table 5b) there is only 
weak evidence indicating that more disperse beliefs affect economic growth rates: the standard 
deviation of beliefs relating to the importance of tradition over technology has a negative effect 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
5. Results 3: Some Causal effects on Beliefs 
5.1. Discussion on the Origin of Beliefs 
The differences in beliefs across America and Europe reported in Alesina et al (2001) are 
striking. Calling them culture pretty much implies that we are not going to be looking for the 
causes of such differences. However, many countries would like to imitate some of the policies 
that the Americans have used in the course of their development. These findings suggest that they 
need to first engineer “American style beliefs”. Then the relevant policy question is can they do 
this or are these beliefs culturally determined? 
The arguments given by anthropologists (reviewed in section IIa) suggest that some 
features of the environment are more conducive to a certain type of beliefs than others. To 
illustrate consider a society where production depends 100% on rainfall. It is then unlikely that 
people would come to believe that effort matters. In less extreme environments learning may 
become mixed with culture in more subtle ways.  
Prior work in this area has studied how corruption taints belief. Di Tella and MacCulloch 
(2002) shows that “pro market” beliefs are negatively correlated with perceptions of corruption. 
This can be observed at the individual level at one point in time, as people who see a lot of 
corruption in the country also declare to think that the government should do more to redistribute 
income to the poor and other left-leaning beliefs. And it can also be observed within countries 
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over time, as countries that experience a shock to their corruption levels elect parties with left 
leaning rhetoric in later years. A simple causal interpretation is that more corruption in the country 
induces people to believe less in the kind of meritocratic forces that support capitalism. 
Corruption may also offend people, leading them to desire changes in the distribution of income 
that arises in a capitalist system. 
Another hypothesis that is backed by some evidence is that owning property may change 
the beliefs that people hold. This hypothesis has long been emphasized by conservative politicians. 
For example, Mrs Thatcher stated 
… we also pioneered two radical policies for wider ownership. The sale of public 
sector houses at large discounts to their tenants turned hundreds of thousands of 
families into property owners. Alongside this, the privatisation of industries with 
special preference for workers and for small buyers began to turn Britain into a nation 
of shareholders. Of course, ownership of assets brings risks as well as rewards. But the 
transformation it effects on a society is wholly positive, because it gives people a stake 
in prosperity and trains them to take control of their own lives. Thatcher (2000).12 
The evidence we have available suggests the size of the effects can be quite large. For 
example, Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2004) study beliefs amongst squatters living in one 
of Argentina’s shanty towns. The key institutional fact used is that only a few of the original 
owners of the occupied land accepted the occupation and subsequent reparation offered by the 
state, while others challenged it in the courts. This led to an exogenous allocation of property 
rights amongst the squatters. They find that there is a large difference in beliefs between the 
Argentine general population and the group of squatters that do not have property rights to the 
small plots of land that they occupy and who are on the lowest income quintile. They find no 
difference, however, between the measure of pro market beliefs held by the average general 
population and the squatters that have property rights. 
 In this spirit, a natural hypothesis for countries with a heavy dependence on natural 
resources to consider is that very noisy income processes (or more precisely, a belief that noise 
dominates the generation of income) reduce the intensity of pro market beliefs. 
One simple implementation of this idea is in the context of oil producing countries. If oil 
or, more broadly, natural resources play an important role in driving GDP movements, then an 
                                                 
12 Convocation Address by Lady Thatcher at Hofstra University, New York, Monday 27 March 2000. 
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important component of individual income is determined by forces outside of the individual’s 
control. It is hard, in such circumstances, for a person to hold on to the beliefs that sustain a truly 
capitalist environment with low taxes and small degree of government intervention, such as one 
maintaining that "In general, people who put effort working end up much better, than those who do not put an 
effort". 
A related idea is that in countries that are more exposed to political and economic risk, 
hard work may end up going without reward since it is more likely for effort investments in these 
kinds of environments to be arbitrarily lost by unpredictable shocks. As a result, it again becomes 
hard for individuals to maintain a belief in the capitalism reward system. The result may be greater 
public support for intervention to reduce exposure to shocks and compensate the losers who have 
fallen behind through no fault of their own. We show in the next section how more risky 
environments are associated with shifts in the belief system of the population. 
Note that we already have evidence that welfare state institutions respond to changes in 
risk. For example, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002) use OECD data for 1970-1990 to present 
evidence consistent with the idea that benefits tend to increase when there are positive changes to 
unemployment.13 Rodrik (1998) finds a positive correlation between a country's level of openness 
and the amount of government consumption and argues that more open economies compensate 
their citizens for the higher employment and income risk they have to face. The evidence comes 
from regressions of social security and welfare expenditures (as a fraction of GDP) on openness 
and terms of trade instability (see also Cameron [1978]). Di Tella and MacCulloch (1995) and 
Luttmer (2001) come closest to our aims by using survey data on the support for welfare spending. 
5.2. Country Risk, Resource Extraction and Beliefs 
Whether beliefs and values are randomly allocated across the world’s population or arise 
due to differing personal and country characteristics can, to some degree, be tested.14 In Tables 6a-
                                                 
13 The idea that one could explain the high persistence of unemployment in Europe when unemployment shocks lead 
to increases in benefits is suggested in an influential review by Blanchard and Katz (1997). Hassler et al (2003) study 
how shocks to the income distribution affect the support by risk-neutral workers for a welfare state whose sole 
purpose is to redistribute wealth.  
14 When explaining general political ideological orientation, the regression evidence suggests that older people are 
more likely to declare themselves as being right-wing compared to younger people (see Di Tella and MacCulloch 
(2005)). It supports the often quoted line “Any man who is under 30 and is not a Liberal has no heart; and any man who is over 
30 and not a Conservative has no brains” variously attributed to Winston Churchill (1874-1965), Georges Clemenceau 
(1841-1929) and Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881). 
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b we report how proxies for the level of natural resources that a country has been endowed with 
(i.e., fuel exports as a proportion of GDP) and the level of country risk shapes people’s economic 
and non-economic beliefs (see the appendix for full variable definitions). We also control for a set 
of individual effects like sex, age, marital status and position within the nation’s income 
distribution. To the extent that countries rely on abundant natural resources, becoming wealthy 
may be more associated with success in capturing rents and belonging to the elite, rather than on 
working hard in competitive industries. High levels of risk may also mean that the connection 
between effort and reward is lost. This may alter, for example, people’s beliefs on the type of 
society they live in and also affect their desired levels of taxation and revolt.15 The three countries 
in our sample in which fuel exports represent a particularly high proportion of GDP (i.e., greater 
than 10%) are Nigeria, Norway and Venezuela. The country with the lowest level of country risk is 
Switzerland (=0.09) and the country with the highest level is (the former) Yugoslavia (=0.52). 
In column (1) we explain beliefs about whether the poor are lazy or have been treated 
unfairly. Fuel Exports has a positive coefficient (indicating that more fuel dependence leads to more 
people ticking the unfair option) although it is not significant. Country risk has a positive 
coefficient that is significant at the 5 per cent level, suggesting that when there is more country risk 
people believe that being poor is not because of laziness or lack of will-power. A one standard 
deviation increase in risk explains 11.5% of a standard deviation in beliefs about whether the poor 
have been treated unfairly. This represents 5.3 percentage points of the population. The largest 
coefficient of all the personal effects occurs for the unemployed, who strongly hold the view that 
they have been unfairly treated by society. Interestingly, the self-employed look at things 
differently – that is, the poor are lazy. The coefficients indicate that unemployment leads to a 9 
percentage point higher probability of ticking the ‘unfair’ option whereas self-employment leads to 
a 5 percentage point higher probability of ticking the ‘lazy’ one. 
The results in column (2) show similar patterns, with fuel exports again positive and 
(weakly) significant at the 11 per cent level, suggesting that a greater reliance on natural resources 
may lead more people to believe that there is little chance of escaping from poverty. Greater 
                                                 
15 Collier and Hoeffler (2002) document a positive relationship between the level of primary commodity exports (as a 
proportion of GDP) and the incidence of civil war across nations using data on 46 conflicts since 1960. Rather than 
emphasizing rent seeking, they explain their result by arguing that rebels need revenues from trading, for example 
diamonds or oil, to fund their movement. Otherwise they may face a binding participation constraint and fail to 
overthrow the regime regardless of how strong are the grievances against the incumbent elite. 
  29 
country risk has a positive and strongly significant coefficient (at the 1 per cent level) meaning that 
more people are pushed toward the left-wing view. A one standard deviation rise in risk explains 
20.6 per cent of a standard deviation in beliefs about the chance of escaping from poverty. This 
represents 10.1 percentage points of the population 
In column (3) a higher proportion of GDP coming from exports of the natural resource in 
a country shifts people strongly toward the view that the government should be doing more to 
help the poor (at the 5 per cent level). A one standard deviation rise in Fuel Exports leads to a 13 
point increase in the latent variable (on a scale where the two cut points are -0.92 and 0.22) and 
explains 21.5 per cent of a standard deviation in beliefs about whether the government should 
help the poor. There are, however, no significant effects of fuel exports on the other two 
economic belief variables (i.e., Business Ownership-L and Fair Pay-L) whereas more country risk 
pushes people more toward the left view for both Government Help Poor-L and Business Ownership-L. 
Table 6b reports the corresponding results for the non-economic belief variables. Column 
(1) shows a strikingly different pattern with respect to how more abundant natural resources and 
greater country risk affect beliefs on whether the government should do more to protect the 
environment. More Fuel Exports and Country Risk both diminish the view that the environment 
should be afforded more protection (i.e., make people more rightist) at the 10 per cent and 1 per 
cent levels, respectively. A one standard deviation rise in Fuel Exports and Country Risk lead to a 
drop in the proportion of people who support the environment of 1.9 and 4.1 percentage points, 
respectively. (On average across the sample, 55.3% of people think that it should be given priority 
over economic growth and jobs where the standard deviation is 49.7%). With respect to the 
personal characteristics, whereas people in the top income quintile prefer more to be done to help 
the environment (suggesting that it is a luxury good), the unemployed want less done and more 
priority to be given to the economy and job creation. These results are also strikingly different 
from those reported in the previous table in which the rich (unemployed) tended to give less 
(more) support for the leftist economic beliefs. 
There are no significant effects of fuel exports on the rest of the non-economic belief 
variables (i.e., Tradition vs Technology-L, Homosexuals-L, Tolerance-L, Capitalists-L). The effect of more 
country risk on these variables is mixed. It pushes people toward the leftist view that emphasizes 
technology over tradition but toward more rightist beliefs of intolerance toward others and that 
homosexuality is not justifiable. The personal characteristics again reveal that in most cases there is 
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more (less) support amongst the rich (unemployed) for the leftist non-economic belief. For 
example, people at the top of the income distribution tend to have more supportive views toward 
homosexuals and greater levels of respect for others’ preferences (although they tend not to dislike 
capitalists the most). By contrast the unemployed express less tolerance toward others. 
Consequently the results suggest that economic and non-economic beliefs are determined 
in very different ways. More country risk pushes people toward more left-wing economic beliefs 
(in all cases except for the question of fair pay) but toward more right-wing non economic beliefs 
about the environment, homosexuality and others preferences. The results for natural resources 
are suggestive of similar patterns: whereas abundant fuel exports push people toward the (left 
wing) economic view that the government should be doing more to help the poor, it has the 
opposite effect on non-economic views about protecting the environment (i.e., it becomes less of 
a priority). Similarly whereas the unemployed hold strongly left-wing economic views on all 
aspects of poverty (i.e., how unfair it is, the low chances of escaping from it and that the 
government should help more), they tend to hold strongly right-wing non-economic views 
regarding the (low) priority that should be attached to the environment and the importance of 
being tolerant. 
In summary, changes in the level of risk in a nation affect most economic beliefs (see 
Table 6a) which may then in turn affect the country’s rate of growth (see Tables 3a-b). A nation’s 
unemployment experience establishes a similar transmission mechanism. With respect to non-
economic beliefs the evidence suggests that they are shaped by similar factors (but in often 
opposite directions, see Table 6b) although there is much less evidence that these kinds of beliefs 
in turn can affect economic performance (see Tables 4a-b).  
6. Conclusions 
There are many aspects of culture. One that has been emphasized by researchers worried 
about institutions is beliefs (e.g., Greif (1994), Denzau and North (1993), inter alia), in particular 
the role of economic beliefs (e.g., Inglehart (1990), Piketty (1995), Alesina et al (2001), inter alia). In 
this paper we study the pattern of beliefs, documenting how they co-vary and their patterns across 
regions. We then study their impact on economic performance. Finally, we discuss characteristics 
of nations that cause different kinds of belief systems to evolve. The evidence gathered supports 
the following: 
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1. Economic beliefs can be divided into two factors. The first emphasizes beliefs 
concerning poverty and the role that individual needs should play in determining 
income. The second emphasizes the role of merit in determining income and attitudes 
about the desirability of private ownership of property.  
2. Non-economic beliefs have far less clear divisions. There is some evidence suggestive 
of a factor embodying the desirability of tradition relative to technology and the extent 
to which the environment should be given priority over economic growth. 
3. There is a statistically significant relationship between economic beliefs and economic 
performance but little evidence of correlations with respect to non-economic beliefs. 
When we include controls for the initial level of GDP (to take account of 
convergence), openness to trade, legal origins (to proxy for institutional quality) and 
latitude of the country (to capture geographical effects) more leftist economic beliefs 
to do with the unfairness of being poor, not being able to escape poverty and 
government help for the poor all lead to lower growth rates, at the 1 per cent level of 
significance. These results indicate that leftist beliefs may have a strong direct economic 
impact (as opposed to an indirect effect via their impact on trade policies and 
institutions). One potential mechanism could be that beliefs about the difficulty of 
escaping from poverty and (economic) life being unfair leads individuals to try less 
hard at work and less hard at searching for a good job as they give up hope. The effect 
is to lower overall economic performance.  
 
It remains possible of course that other beliefs (e.g., that the government should do 
more to help the poor) leads voters to support different types of political parties. 
Consequently there may also be strong indirect effects of beliefs on economic 
performance to the extent that they lead to parties implementing different institutional 
arrangements and policy settings.  
4. We also test for the importance of the dispersion of beliefs on economic performance. 
There is some (weak) evidence suggesting that more disperse beliefs may potentially 
damage a nation in terms of its rate of GDP growth. 
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5. The paper also seeks to identify some of the exogenous factors affecting the formation 
of beliefs (i.e., where they originate from). With respect to economic beliefs, we find 
that more country risk pushes people strongly toward the view that the poor are not 
lazy or lack will power, there is little chance of escaping from poverty, the government 
should be doing more for the poor and that employees/government should be more 
involved in running businesses (i.e., all the left wing views). Greater dependence on 
natural resources has the same effect on views about government help for the poor. By 
contrast these factors have strikingly different effects on our non-economic beliefs. 
For example, more country risk and natural resources reduce the conviction that the 
environment should be afforded more protection (i.e., shifts people more toward the 
rightist position). Country risk also tends to make people less tolerant toward other 
groups.  
Overall, the evidence supports the view that cultural specificities may be able to explain 
why certain institutions cannot be transplanted between countries with a different cultural history 
and underlines the limits to policy activism. 
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8. Figures and Tables 
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Gov't Helping the Poor?: 25, 50 & 75th Percentiles
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Who Should Run Business? 25, 50 & 75th Percentiles























































Homosexuality Justifiable? 25, 50 & 75th Percentiles
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Table 1.a 
Correlation Coefficients between Economic Values and Beliefs, 1981-95. 
 
Unfair for Poor No Escape Government  Business Fair Pay-L 
 - L - L help Poor-L Ownership-L  
      
Unfair for Poor – L 1     
      
No Escape – L  0.39 1    
      
Government help Poor – L 0.36 0.32 1   
      
Business Ownership – L 0.11 0.09 0.10 1  
      
Fair Pay – L 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 1 
      
      
Note: Data are from World Values Survey and are based on 47,567 observations. p-values are 











Factor Analysis of Economic Attributes: Principal Factors, Two factors are retained. 
 Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative 
 
   
Factor 1 1.764 0.353 0.3527 
    
Factor 2 1.021 0.204 0.5569 
    
Factor 3 0.945 0.189 0.7458 
    
Factor 4 0.675 0.135 0.8809 
    
Factor 5 0.596 0.119 1 
    






Economic Attributes: Factor Loadings 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
 
  
Unfair for Poor – L 0.771 0.057 
     
No Escape – L 0.746 -0.022 
   
Government help Poor – L 0.731 -0.086 
   
Business Ownership- L 0.271 0.465 
   
Fair Pay – L -0.057 0.892 
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Table 2.a 
Correlation Coefficients between Non-Economic Values and Beliefs, 1981-95. 
 Environment-L Tradition vs  Homosexuals-L Tolerance-L Capitalists-L 
  Technology-R    
      
Environment – L 1.000     
      
Tradition vs Technology - R 0.082 1.000    
      
Homosexuals – L 0.078 -0.019 1.000   
      
Tolerance – L 0.081 0.063 0.062 1.000  
      
Capitalists – L 0.002 0.008 -0.023 -0.029 1.000 
      
      
Note: Data are from World Values Survey and are based on 39,039 observations. p-values are 
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Table 2.b 
Factor Analysis of Non-Economic Attributes: Principal Factors, Three factors are retained. 
 Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative 
 
   
Factor 1 1.173 0.235 0.235 
    
Factor 2 1.014 0.203 0.437 
    
Factor 3 1.012 0.202 0.640 
    
Factor 4 0.918 0.184 0.823 
    
Factor 5 0.884 0.177 1.000 
    





Non-Economic Attributes: Factor Loadings. 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
 
   
Environment – L 0.397 0.062 0.528 
    
Tradition vs Technology - R -0.190 0.054 0.821 
    
Homosexuals – L 0.832 0.094 -0.156 
    
Tolerance – L 0.443 -0.356 0.343 
    
Capitalists – L 0.057 0.934 0.049 
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Figure 3a: (Average) GDP Growth Rates and Leftist Beliefs about Why 
People are Poor / in Need? (0=Laziness; 1=Unfairness), 1980-97. 
 
 
Figure 3b: (Average) GDP Growth Rate and Leftist beliefs on ‘Chance of 
Escaping Poverty’ (0=Chance; 1=Very Little Chance), 1980-97 
 
 
Figure 3c: (Average) GDP Growth Rates and Leftist beliefs on what Government 
is Doing for the Poor (0=Too much; 1=About right; 2=Too little), 1980-97. 
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Figure 3d: (Average) GDP Growth Rates and Leftist beliefs on How Business should be 






Figure 3e: (Average) GDP Growth Rates and Leftist beliefs on whether it is  
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Table 3.a 
Growth Regressions on Economic Attributes of Values/Beliefs 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Growth Rate (1981-97)       
       Economic Attributes       
   Poverty:     Unfair for Poor - L -0.12**      
   (0.04)      
                   No Escape - L  -0.07**     
  (0.03)     
                   Gov’t help Poor - L      -0.08**    
   (0.03)    
   Production: Business Ownership- L       -0.03**   
    (0.01)   
   Incentives:  Fair Pay - L       0.09**  
     (0.03)  
Economic factor 1 
 
     -0.04** 
      (0.01) 
Economic factor 2      0.02 
      (0.04) 
       
R2 overall 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05 
No. of Observations 584 584 550 850 833 533 
No. of Groups 40 40 38 56 55 37 
Note: Regressions estimated using Random (Country) Effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bold-face is significant at 
10 percent level; Starred-bold at 5 per cent level; Double-starred bold at 1 percent level. Economic Attributes have L (R) 
extension if higher numbers mean more Left (Right). They are the 1980-1997 (average) answers to the following questions:  
Unfair for Poor-L: Why in your opinion are there people in this country who live in need? Here are two opinions: which is 
closest to yours? “1. They are poor because of laziness & lack of willpower, OR  2. They are poor because society treats them unfairly.” 
(Unfair for Poor-L was redefined to equal 0 if the answer is category (1) and 1 if the answer is category (2)). 
No Escape-L: In your opinion, do most poor people in this country have a chance of escaping from poverty, or there is 
very little chance of escaping? “1. They have a chance, OR 2. There is very little chance.” (No Escape-L was redefined to equal 
0 if the answer is category (1) and 1 if the answer is category (2)). 
Govt’ help Poor-L: Do you think that what the government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right 
amount, too much, or too little? “1. Too much, OR 2. About the right amount, OR 3. Too little.” 
Business Ownership-L: There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these 
four statements comes closest to your opinion? “1. The owners should run their business or appoint the managers. 2. The owners 
and the employees should participate in the selection of managers. 3. The government should be the owner and appoint the managers. 4. The 
employees should own the business and should elect the managers.” 
Fair Pay-L: Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns 
considerably more than she does. The better paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her 
job. In your opinion, is it fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other? “1. Fair, OR 2. Not fair.” (Fair 
Pay-L was redefined to equal 0 if the answer is category (1) and 1 if the answer is category (2)). 
Economic factor 1/2: These are the two factors and corresponding loadings on the five belief variables from Table 1c. 
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Table 3.b 
Growth Regressions on Economic Attributes of Values/Beliefs 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Growth Rate (1981-97)       
 
      GDP 1975-1980 -2e-6** -2e-6* -2e-6** -1e-6 -2e-6* -2e-6* 
 (8e-7) (9e-7) (9e-7) (8e-7) (7e-7) (9e-7) 
Trade: Openness 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.03 0.03 0.09** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Institutions: German Legal Origin -0.01 -0.02 0.004 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
                  Scandinavian Leg. Origin -0.05 -0.07* -0.04 -0.003 -0.05 -0.07* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
                  Socialist Leg. Origin -0.05** -0.05** -0.04* -0.04** -0.03* -0.04** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
                   English Legal Origin -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 0.01 0.01 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Geography: Latitude 0.11* 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.09 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
Economic Attributes       
   Poverty:     Unfair for Poor - L -0.12**      
   (0.04)      
                   No Escape - L  -0.08**     
  (0.03)     
                   Gov’t help Poor - L      -0.07*    
   (0.03)    
   Production: Business Ownership- L       0.02   
    (0.02)   
   Incentives:  Fair Pay - L       0.05  
     (0.04)  
Economic factor 1 
 
     -0.04** 
      (0.01) 
Economic factor 2      0.04 
      (0.04) 
R2 overall 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.09 
No. of Observations 571 571 537 820 803 520 
No. of Groups 38 38 36 53 52 35 
Note: Regressions estimated using Random (Country) Effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bold-face is significant at 10 percent 
level; Starred-bold at 5 per cent level; Double-starred bold at 1 percent level. Economic Attributes have L (R) extension if higher numbers 
mean more Left (Right). They are the 1980-1997 (average) answers to the following questions:  
Unfair for Poor-L: Why in your opinion are there people in this country who live in need? Here are two opinions: which is closest to 
your view? “1. They are poor because of laziness & lack of willpower, OR 2. They are poor because society treats them unfairly.” (Unfair for Poor-L was 
redefined to equal 0 if the answer is category (1) and 1 if the answer is category (2)). 
No Escape-L: In your opinion, do most poor people in this country have a chance of escaping from poverty, or there is very little 
chance of escaping? “1. They have a chance, OR 2. There is very little chance.” (No Escape-L was redefined to equal 0 if the answer is category (1) 
and 1 if the answer is category (2)). 
Govt’ help Poor-L: Do you think that what the government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right amount, too 
much, or too little? “1. Too much, OR 2. About the right amount, OR 3. Too little.” 
Business Ownership-L: There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four 
statements comes closest to your opinion? “1. The owners should run their business or appoint the managers. 2. The owners and the employees should 
participate in the selection of managers. 3. The government should be the owner and appoint the managers. 4. The employees should own the business and should 
elect the managers.” 
Fair Pay-L: Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns considerably 
more than she does. The better paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it fair or 
not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other? “1. Fair, OR 2. Not fair.” (Fair Pay-L was redefined to equal 0 if the answer is 
category (1) and 1 if the answer is category (2)). 
Economic factor 1, 2: The factors and corresponding loadings on the five belief variables from Table 1c. 
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Figure 4a: (Average) GDP Growth Rates and Leftist Beliefs about whether Economy 
or Environment has Priority? (1=Economy; 10=Environment), 1980-97. 
 
 
Figure 4b: (Average) GDP Growth Rate and Beliefs on whether we should Emphasize 
Technology or Tradition (0=Technology; 1=Tradition), 1980-97 
 
 
Figure 4c: (Average) GDP Growth Rates and Leftist Beliefs about Morality of  
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Figure 4d: (Average) GDP Growth Rates and Leftist beliefs on whose Preferences 






Figure 4e: (Average) GDP Growth Rates and Leftist beliefs on Most Disliked Group 
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Table 4.a 
Cross-Sectional Growth Regressions on Non-Economic Attributes of Values/Beliefs 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Growth Rate (1981-97)       
       
Non-Economic Attributes       
 Nature: Environment – L 0.03      
 (0.05)      
     Tradition vs Technology - R  -0.12**     
  (0.04)     
 Authoritarian & Moral: Homosexuals - L   0.006    
   (0.003)    
                               Tolerance - L    0.03   
    (0.04)   
                               Capitalists - L                            0.05  
     (0.06)  
Non-Economic factor 1 
 
     0.004 
      (0.01) 
Non-Economic factor 2      -0.07 
      (0.07) 
Non-Economic factor 3      -0.12** 
      (0.04) 
       
R2 overall 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.06 
No. of Observations 618 567 850 550 550 465 
No. of Groups 42 39 56 38 38 33 
Note: Regressions estimated using Random (Country) Effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Bold-face significant at 10 
percent level; Starred bold at 5 per cent level; Double-starred bold at 1 percent level. Non-Economic Attributes have L (R) 
extension if higher numbers mean more Left (Right). They are the 1980-1997 (average) answers to the following questions:  
Environment-L: Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic 
growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view? “1. Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if 
it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs, OR 2. Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the 
environment suffers to some extent.” (Environment-L was redefined to equal 0 if the answer is category (2) and 1 if it is 
category (1)). 
Tradition vs Technology-R: For the following statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your own views. “1. 
We should emphasize tradition more than high technology, OR 2. We should emphasize high technology more than tradition.” (Tradition 
vs Technology-L was redefined to equal 0 if the answer is category (2) and 1 if the answer is category (1)). 
Homosexuals-L: Please tell me if homosexuality can always be justified, never be justified or something in between, using 
this card. “Card shows a scale from 1 to 10 where 1= Never justifiable, 10= Always justifiable.” 
Tolerance-L: For the following pair of statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your own views. “1. To build 
good human relationships, it is most important to try to understand other's preferences, OR 2. To build good relationships, it is most 
important to express one's own preferences clearly.” (Tolerance-L was redefined so that it equals 0 if the answer is category (2) 
and 1 if the answer is category (1)). 
Capitalists-L: I’d like to ask you about some groups that some people feel are threatening to the social and political order 
of society. Would you please select from the following list the one group or organization that you like least? “1. Jews; 
2. Capitalists; 3. Stalinists/hard line communists; 4. Immigrants; 5. Homosexuals; 6. Criminals; 7. Neo-Nazis/Right extremists.” 
(Capitalists-L equals 1 if the answer is category (2) and 0 otherwise.) 
Non-Economic factor 1, 2, 3: The factors and corresponding loadings on the five belief variables from Table 2c. 
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Table 4.b 
Growth Regressions on Non-Economic Attributes of Values/Beliefs 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Growth Rate (1981-97)       
GDP 1975-1980 -2e-6* -1e-7 -2e-6* -2e-6 -1e-6 -8e-7 
 (9e-7) (8e-7) (9e-7) (9e-7) (1e-6) (1e-6) 
Trade: Openness 0.05 0.06* 0.03 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Institutions: German Legal Origin 0.004 0.001 0.01 -0.004 -0.03 -0.06 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
                  Scandinavian Legal Origin -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
                  Socialist Legal Origin -0.04* -0.05** -0.03* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
                  English Legal Origin 0.01 -0.01 0.004 -0.001 0.003 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Geography: Latitude 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.07 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Non-Economic Attributes       
   Nature: Environment – L 0.06      
 (0.06)      
          Tradition vs Technology - R  -0.14**     
  (0.04)     
  Authoritarian & Moral: Homosexuals - L      0.002    
   (0.005)    
                                     Tolerance - L    0.07   
    (0.05)   
                                     Capitalists - L                            0.04  
     (0.07)  
Non-Economic factor 1 
 
     0.002 
      (0.01) 
Non-Economic factor 2      -0.14 




    (0.10) 




ogy - L 
    -0.11* 
      (0.05) 
R2 overall 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.08 
No. of Observations 605 554 820 537 537 452 
No. of Groups 40 37 53 36 36 31 
Note: Regressions estimated using Random (Country) Effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Bold-face is significant at 10 
percent level; Starred bold at 5 per cent level; Double-starred bold at 1 percent level. Non-Economic Attributes have L (R) 
extension if higher numbers mean more Left (Right). They are the 1980-1997 (average) answers to the following questions:  
Environment-L: Here are 2 statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment & economic growth. Which comes 
closer to your own point of view? “1. Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of 
jobs, OR 2. Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.” (Environment-L redefined to 
equal 0 if the answer is category (2) and 1 if it is category (1)). 
Tradition vs Technology-R: For the following statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your own views. “1. We should 
emphasize tradition more than high technology, OR 2. We should emphasize high technology more than tradition.” (Tradition vs Technology-R was 
redefined to equal 0 if the answer is category (2) and 1 if the answer is category (1)). 
Homosexuals-L: Please tell me if homosexuality can always be justified, never be justified or something in between, using this card. 
“Card shows a scale from 1 to 10 where 1= Never justifiable, 10= Always justifiable.” 
Tolerance-L: Please tell me which [statement] comes closest to your own views. “1. To build good human relationships, it is most important to try 
to understand other's preferences. 2. To build good relationships, it is most important to express one's own preferences clearly.” (Tolerance-L was 
redefined so that it equals 0 if the answer is category (2) and 1 if the answer is category (1)). 
Capitalists-L: I’d like to ask you about some groups that some people feel are threatening to the social and political order of society. 
Would you please select from the following list the one group or organization that you like least? “1. Jews; 2. Capitalists; 3. 
Stalinists/hard line communists; 4. Immigrants; 5. Homosexuals; 6. Criminals; 7. Neo-Nazis/Right extremists.” (Capitalists-L equals 1 if the 
answer is category (2) and 0 otherwise.) 
Non-Economic factor 1, 2, 3: The factors and corresponding loadings on the five belief variables from Table 2c. 
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Table 5a 
Growth Regressions on Mean and Dispersion of Values/Beliefs 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Growth Rate (1981-97)       
GDP 1975-1980 -2e-6* -1e-6 -2e-6* -1e-6 -2e-6* -2e-6 
 (8e-7) (8e-7) (1e-6) (8e-7) (7e-7) (1e-6) 
Trade 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.03 0.03 0.09** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Institutions: German Legal Origin -0.01 -0.04 0.005 0.01 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
                  Scandinavian Legal Origin -0.05 -0.07* -0.05 -0.01 -0.004 -0.08* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
                  Socialist Legal Origin -0.05** -0.06** -0.05* -0.04* -0.02 -0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
                   English Legal Origin -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.008 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Geography: Latitude 0.10* 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.10 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
Economic Attributes:        
   Poverty: (mean) Unfair for Poor - L  -0.08      
 (0.07)      
              (standard deviation)                                0.13      
 (0.20)      
              (mean) No Escape – L             -0.08**     
  (0.03)     
              (standard deviation)  -0.28**     
  (0.12)     
              (mean) Gov’t help Poor – L       -0.12    
   (0.09)    
              (standard deviation)                                  -0.11    
   (0.19)    
   Production: (mean) Business Ownership - L     0.02   
    (0.03)   
                   (standard deviation)                                   -0.03   
     (0.06)   
   Incentives: (mean) Fair Pay – L              -0.02  
     (0.10)  
                 (standard deviation)                             0.14  
     (0.17)  
Economic Factor 1 (mean)        -0.05* 
       (0.02) 
                          (standard deviation)      0.06 
      (0.06) 
Economic Factor 2 (mean)        -0.02 
      (0.09) 
                          (standard deviation)      -0.08 
      (0.16) 
R2 overall 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.10 
No. of Observations 571 571 537 820 803 520 
No. of Groups 38 38 36 53 52 35 
Note: Regressions estimated using Random (Country) Effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Bold-face is 
significant at 10 percent level; Starred-bold at 5 per cent level; Double-starred bold at 1 percent level. For 
definitions of the economic attributes and factors, see the footnote to Table 3a and appendix 1. 
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Table 5b 
Growth Regressions on Mean and Dispersion of Values/Beliefs 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Growth Rate (1981-97)       
GDP 1975-1980 -2e-6 4e-8 -2e-6* -2e-6 -1e-6 -6e-7 
 (9e-7) (8e-7) (9e-7) (9e-7) (1e-6) (1e-6) 
Trade 0.05 0.07* 0.03 0.07* 0.07* 0.11** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Institutions: German Legal Origin 0.001 -0.006 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
                  Scandinavian Legal Origin -0.03 -0.05 -0.007 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
                  Socialist Legal Origin -0.04* -0.06** -0.03* -0.05* -0.05* -0.06* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
                   English Legal Origin 0.01 -0.02 0.005 5e-4 0.003 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Geography: Latitude 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Non-Economic Attributes:        
   Nature: (mean) Environment - L          0.03      
 (0.07)      
              (standard deviation) -0.18      
 (0.31)      
              (mean) Tradition vs Technology - R  -0.10*     
  (0.04)     
              (standard deviation)  -0.22     
  (0.14)     
   Authoritarian & Moral: (mean) Homosexuals - L   -0.003    
   (0.008)    
                                     (standard deviation)   0.01    
   (0.02)    
                                     (mean) Tolerance – L      0.05   
    (0.06)   
                                     (standard deviation)      -0.19   
    (0.19)   
                                     (mean) Capitalists – L     0.04  
     (0.14)  
                                     (standard deviation)       0.003  
     (0.15)  
Non-Economic Factor 1  (mean)        0.02 
       (0.02) 
                                  (standard deviation)      0.02 
       (0.04) 
Non-Economic Factor 2  (mean)        -0.35* 
       (0.15) 
                                  (standard deviation)      0.41* 
      (0.21) 
Non-Economic Factor 3  (mean)        -0.07 
       (0.04) 
                                  (standard deviation)      -0.38 
      (0.21) 
R2 overall 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.14 
No. of Observations 605 554 820 537 537 452 
No. of Groups 40 37 53 36 36 31 
Note: Regressions estimated using Random (Country) Effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Bold-face is 
significant at 10 percent level; Starred-bold at 5 per cent level; Double-starred bold at 1 percent level. For definitions 
of the non-economic attributes and factors, see the footnote to Table 4a and appendix 1. 
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Table 6a 
The Origins of Economic Beliefs, Probit Regressions, 1981-95. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable:  Unfair for Poor-L No Escape-L Gov’t help Poor-L Bus. Own.-L Fair Pay-L 
      Fuel Exports 0.43 0.46 1.81* -1.06 0.16 
 (0.33) (0.29) (0.74) (0.88) (0.19) 
Country Risk 0.44* 0.84** 1.36* 1.19** 0.30 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.65) (0.45) (0.20) 
Personal Income Quintile: 2nd  0.02 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.03** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) 
                                    3rd  -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.04** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.01) 
                                    4th  -0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.12 -0.06** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.06) (0.01) 
                                    5th  -0.05 -0.01 -0.12 -0.28** -0.11** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.06) (0.01) 
Work Status: Unemployed 0.09** 0.10** 0.22** 0.01** 0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.01) 
                    Self employed -0.05* -0.05 -0.04 -0.20** -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.01) 
                    Retired 0.09** 0.09** 0.21** 0.06 -2.6e-3 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.01) 
                    Student 0.02 4.2e-3 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.01) 
                    Home -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.11 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.02) 
Male -0.05** -0.06** -0.10** -0.06* -0.02** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Age  0.01* 0.01 0.01** 0.01 -1.8e-3 
 (2.4e-3) (2.0e-3) (5.4e-3) (3.7e-3) (8.3e-4) 
Age squared -6.7e-5 -5.0e-5 -2.1e-4 -1.1e-4 3.0e-6 
 (2.4e-5) (2.0e-5) (5.5e-5) (3.8e-5) (9.1e-6) 
      
Pseudo-R2 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 
Number of observations 25,670 29,728 26,420 82,945 82,859 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Bold-face is significant at 10 percent level; Starred-bold at 5 per 
cent level; Double-starred bold at 1 percent level. Cols (1), (2) and (5) are probits, marginal probabilities 
reported; cols (3) and (4) are ordered probits (cut_1=-0.92, s.e.=0.25; cut_2=0.22, s.e.=0.20 for col (3); 
cut_1=-0.13, s.e.=0.17; cut_2=1.10, s.e.=0.14, cut_3=1.34 s.e.=0.14  for col (4)); Number of nations is 27 
for cols (1-2), 25 for col. (3), 42 for col. (4) and 40 for col. (5). For definitions of the dependent variables 
in columns (1-5), see the footnote to Table 3a and appendix 1. Standard errors on Country Risk and Fuel 
Exports adjusted to take account of clustering within countries. 
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Table 6b 
The Origins of Non-Economic Beliefs, Probit Regressions, 1981-95. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable:  Environment-L Trad. vs Tech.-R Homosex.-L Tolerance-L Capitalists-L 
      Fuel Exports -0.27 0.41 -0.72 0.04 -3.3e-3 
 (0.15) (0.26) (0.74) (0.44) (0.17) 
Country Risk -0.34** -0.89** -2.70** -0.67** 0.04 
 (0.14) (0.21) (0.64) (0.22) (0.20) 
Personal Income Quintile: 2nd  0.02 -4.3e-3 0.02 0.01 -0.04 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
                                    3rd  0.03 -0.05 0.08 0.07* -0.07 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
                                    4th  0.05* -0.03 0.13** 0.09* -0.08 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
                                    5th  0.06* -0.07* 0.23** 0.08 -0.08 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) 
Work Status: Unemployed -0.05* 0.05 0.01 -0.06** -1.7e-3 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) 
                    Self employed -0.01 -0.01 -0.12* -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) 
                    Retired 1.8e-3 0.04 -0.02 -1.3e-3 -0.04 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) 
                    Student 0.01 -0.05 0.21** -0.01 -0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) 
                    Home -0.03 0.02 -0.22** -0.08* -8.5e-4 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) 
Male -0.02* -0.10** -0.20** -0.03* 0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age  3.5e-5 3.3e-4 0.01 1.7e-3 -1.1e-3 
 (1.6e-3) (2.5e-3) (4.0e-3) (1.3e-3) (1.6e-3) 
Age squared -2.4e-5 2.5e-5 -2.0e-4 3.3e-7 1.2e-5 
 (2.0e-5) (2.7e-5) (4.1e-5) (1.5e-5) (1.6e-5) 
      
Pseudo-R2 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 
Number of observations 25,739 25,577 89,606 26,402 27,027 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Bold-face is significant at 10 percent level; Starred-bold at 5 per 
cent level; Double-starred bold at 1 percent level. Cols (1), (2), (4) and (5) are probits, marginal 
probabilities reported; col. (3) is ordered probit (cut_1=-0.87, s.e.=0.20; cut_2=-0.72, s.e.=0.20; cut_3=-
0.58, s.e.=0.20; cut_4=-0.47, s.e.=0.20; cut_5=-0.10, s.e.=0.20; cut_6=0.06, s.e.=0.20; cut_7=0.19, 
s.e.=0.20; cut_8=0.37, s.e.=0.20; cut_9=0.50, s.e.=0.20); Number of nations is 28 for col. (1), 26 for col. 
(2), 42 for col. (3), 25 for col. (4) and 24 for col. (5); For definitions of the dependent variables in 
columns (1-5), see the footnote to Table 4a and appendix 1. Standard errors on Country Risk and Fuel 
Exports adjusted to take account of clustering within countries. 
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Appendix: List of Countries and Survey Description 
Table A: List of Countries 











































Czech Republic,  
Estonia, 












Slovak Republic,  
Slovenia,  




World Values Survey and European Values Survey (1981-84, 1990-92, 1995-97, 2000-04) 
The Combined World Values Survey is produced by the Institute for Social Research, Ann 
Arbor, MI, USA. The series is designed to enable a cross-national comparison of values and 
norms on a wide variety of norms and to monitor changes in values and attitudes across the 
globe. Both national random and quota sampling were used. All of the surveys were carried out 
through face-to-face interviews, with a sampling universe consisting of all adult citizens, aged 18 
and older, across over 60 nations around the world. The 1981-83 survey covered 22 independent 
countries; the 1990-93 survey covered 42 independent countries; the 1995-97 survey covered 53 
independent countries. In total, 64 independent countries have been surveyed in at least one 
wave of this investigation (counting East Germany as an independent country, which it was 
when first surveyed). These countries include almost 80 percent of the world’s population. A 
fourth wave of surveys is being carried out in 1999-2000-04.  
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Data Definitions 
 
Economic  Beliefs 
 
Unfair for Poor–L: The response to the World values question: “Why, in your opinion, are there 
people in this country who live in need? Here are two opinions: which comes closest to 
your view?  (1) They are poor because of laziness and lack of willpower, or (2) They are 
poor because society treats them unfairly.” (Unfair for Poor-L was redefined to equal 0 if 
the answer is category (1) and 1 if the answer is category (2)). 
 
No Escape–L: The response to the World Values question: “In your opinion, do most poor 
people in this country have a chance of escaping from poverty, or there is very little 
chance of escaping?  (1) They have a chance or (2) There is very little chance.” (No 
Escape-L was redefined to equal 0 if the answer is category (1) and 1 if the answer is 
category (2)). 
 
Government help Poor–L: The response to the World Values question: “Do you think that what the 
government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right amount, too 
much, or too little? (1) Too much, (2) About the right amount, or (3) Too little.” 
 
Business Ownership-L: The response to the World Values question: “There is a lot of discussion 
about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four statements 
comes closest to your opinion? (1) The owners should run their business or appoint the 
managers, (2) The owners and the employees should participate in the selection of 
managers, (3) The government should be the owner and appoint the managers, (4) The 
employees should own the business and should elect the managers.” 
 
Fair Pay-L: The response to the World Values question: “Imagine two secretaries, of the same 
age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns considerably more 
than she does. The better paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more 
reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more 
than the other? (1) Fair or (2) Not fair.” (Fair Pay-L was redefined to equal 0 if the 





Tradition vs Technology-R: The response to the World Values question: “For the following pair of 
statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your own views. (1) We should 
emphasize tradition more than high technology, OR (2) We should emphasize high 
technology more than tradition.” (Tradition vs Technology-R was redefined to equal 0 if the 
answer is category (2) and 1 if the answer is category (1)). 
 
Environment-L: The response to the World Values question: “Here are two statements people 
sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of 
them comes closer to your own point of view? (1) Protecting the environment should be 
given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs. (2). 
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Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment 
suffers to some extent.” (Environment-L was redefined to equal 0 if the answer is category 
(2) and 1 if the answer is category (1)). 
 
Capitalists-L: The response to the World Values question: “I’d like to ask you about some groups 
that some people feel are threatening to the social and political order of society. Would 
you please select from the following list the one group or organization that you like least? 
(1) Jews; (2) Capitalists; (3) Stalinists/hard line communists (or country equivalent); (4) 
Immigrants; (5) Homosexuals; (6) Criminals; (7) Neo-Nazis/Right extremists (or country 
equivalents).” (Capitalists-L was redefined to equal 1 if the answer is category (2) and 0 
otherwise.) 
 
Tolerance-L: The response to the World Values question: “The response to the World Values 
question: “For the following pair of statements, please tell me which one comes closest 
to your own views. To build good human relationships (1) It is most important to try to 
understand other's preferences OR (2) To build good relationships, it is most important 
to express one's own preferences clearly.” (Tolerance-L was redefined to equal 0 if the 
answer is category (2) and 1 if the answer is category (1)). 
 
Homosexuals-L: The response to the World Values question: “Please tell me if homosexuality can 
always be justified, never be justified or something in between, using this card. Card 
shows a scale from 1 to 10 where (1)=Never justifiable, (10)=Always justifiable.” 
 
 
Aggregate Level Variables 
 
Latitude: The absolute value of the geographical latitude of the country in degrees measured from 
the equator. That is, the range is from zero degrees (the equator) to 90 degrees at the two 
poles. 
 
Trade (Openness): Imports plus exports divided by GDP (from World Development Indicators, 
World Bank.). 
 
Growth Rate: The growth rate of GDP per capita in constant 1992 US$, purchasing power parity 
adjusted, from World Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
 
GDP 1975-1980: Average GDP per capita between 1975 and 1980 (inclusive) in constant 1992 
US$, purchasing power parity adjusted, from World Development Indicators of the 
World Bank. 
 
Institutions: The quality of institutions, as proxied by whether the country has Socialist, 
Scandinavian, French, German or English legal origins. The base category is French 
origins. 
 
Fuel Exports: Fuel Exports as a proportion of GDP (from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators 2000). 
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Country Risk: A country risk rating on a 0-1 scale (from The PRS Group, Inc., 1979-2004, East 
Syracuse, NY 13057 USA). The composite rating provides a means of assessing the 
Political Risk, Financial Risk and Economic Risk of countries on a comparable basis. 
This is done by assigning risk points to a pre-set group of factors. A separate index is 
created for each of the subcategories. The Political Risk index is based on 100 points, 
Financial Risk on 50 points, and Economic Risk on 50 points. The total points from the 
three indices are divided by two to produce the weights for inclusion in the composite 
country risk score. The composite scores range from zero to 100 points.  
 
Political Risk is an assessment of political stability that weights 12 factors 
covering both political and social attributes: Government Stability, Socioeconomic 
Conditions, Investment Profile, Internal Conflict, External Conflict, Corruption, Military 
in Politics, Religious Tensions, Law and Order, Ethnic Tensions, Democratic 
Accountability and Bureaucracy Quality. PRS staff converts political information on 
these factors into risk points for each of these components on the basis of subjective 
analysis of the available information. 
 
Financial Risk is an assessment a country’s ability to pay its way. In essence this 
requires a system of measuring a country’s ability to finance its official, commercial, and 
trade debt obligations. It weights the five factors: Foreign Debt as a Percentage of GDP, 
Foreign Debt Service as a Percentage of XGS, Current Account as a Percentage of XGS, 
Net Liquidity as Months of Import Cover and Exchange Rate Stability.  
 
Economic Risk Rating is to provide a means of assessing a country’s current 
economic strengths and weaknesses. In general terms where its strengths outweigh its 
weaknesses it will present a low economic risk and where its weaknesses outweigh its 
strengths it will present a high economic risk. It weights the five factors GDP per Head 
of Population, Real Annual GDP Growth, Annual Inflation Rate, Budget Balance as a 
Percentage of GDP, Current Account Balance as a Percentage of GDP. 
 
Each component is assigned a maximum numerical value (risk points). The 
maximum points able to be awarded to any particular risk component is pre-set within 
the system and depends on the importance (weighting) of that component to the overall 
risk of a country. The minimum number of points that can be assigned to each 
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Summary Statistics for Economic Performance Regressions in Tables 3-4. 
Variable Number of Mean Standard Min. Max. 
 Observations  Deviation   
      
Growth Rate 820 0.01 0.07 -0.44 0.22 
GDP 1975-1980 820 8,856 6,645 670 32,517 
Trade: Openness 820 0.23 0.19 0 0.83 
Institutions: German Legal Origin 53 0.09 0.28 0 1 
                 Scandinavian Legal Origin 53 0.09 0.28 0 1 
                 Socialist Legal Origin               53 0.29 0.45 0 1 
                 English Legal Origin 53 0.21 0.41 0 1 
                 French Legal Origin 53 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Geography: Latitude 53 0.40 0.18 0.09 0.71 
Fuel Exports 42 0.03 0.07 0 0.33 
Country Risk 42 0.28 0.12 0.09 0.52 
      
Economic Attributes:      
  Unfair for Poor – L 40 0.68 0.15 0.35 0.88 
  No Escape – L  40 0.57 0.19 0.12 0.87 
  Government help Poor – L 38 2.64 0.21 2.07 2.91 
  Business Ownership – L 56 1.97 0.29 1.58 2.78 
  Fair Pay – L 55 0.24 0.12 0.05 0.61 
      
Non-Economic Attributes:      
  Environment – L 42 0.56 0.11 0.30 0.78 
  Tradition vs Technology - R 39 0.46 0.15 0.08 0.70 
  Homosexuals – L 56 3.14 1.22 1.29 6.58 
  Tolerance – L 38 0.61 0.15 0.19 0.83 
  Capitalists – L 38 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.53 
      
* Data are from World Economic Indicators and the World Values Surveys. 
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